In this paper, we propose a reasonable definition of predicate-hiding inner product encryption (IPE) in a public key setting, which we call inner product encryption with ciphertext conversion (IPE-CC), where original ciphertexts are converted to predicate-searchable ones by an helper in possession of a conversion key. We then define a notion of full security for IPE-CC, which comprises three security properties of being adaptively predicateand attribute-hiding in the public key setting, adaptively (fully-)attribute-hiding against the helper, and usefully secure even against the private-key generator (PKG). We then present the first fully secure IPE-CC scheme, and convert it into the first fully secure symmetric-key IPE (SIPE) scheme, where the security is defined in the sense of Shen, Shi, Waters. All the security properties are proven under the decisional linear assumption in the standard model. The IPE-CC scheme is comparably as efficient as existing attribute-hiding (not predicate-hiding) IPE schemes. We also present a variant of the proposed IPE-CC scheme with the same security that achieves shorter public and secret keys. We employ two key techniques, trapdoor basis setup, in which a new trapdoor is embedded in a public key, and multi-system proof technique, which further generalizes an extended dual system approach given by Okamoto and Takashima recently. * This is the full version of a paper appearing in
Introduction

Background
The notion of predicate encryption (PE) was explicitly presented by Katz, Sahai and Waters [14] for achieving fine-grained control over revealed information on encrypted data for various predicate-searchable token key owners. In the encryption system, the owner of a (master) secret key can create and issue tokens to system users. Informally, tokens in a predicate encryption scheme correspond to predicates in some class F, and a sender associates a ciphertext with an attribute in a set Σ; a ciphertext ct x associated with the attribute (or plaintext) x ∈ Σ can be evaluated by token tk f corresponding to the predicate f ∈ F to learn whether f (x) = 1. In this paper, we only consider this predicate-only PE [14, 24] , in which attribute x can be treated as a plaintext in a general functional encryption framework [9] . (However, we treat x as an attribute hereafter.)
In addition, a security notion for PE, attribute-hiding, was defined in [14] , where, roughly speaking, a ciphertext conceals the associated attribute. More specifically, it requires that an adversary in possession of tokens tk f 1 , . . . , tk f h for predicates f 1 , . . . , f h cannot derive any information on attribute x from ciphertext ct x other than the values of f 1 (x), . . . , f h (x).
Katz, Sahai and Waters [14] also presented a concrete construction of PE for a class of predicates called inner product predicates, which represents a wide class of predicates that includes an equality test (for IBE [2, 3, 5, 11] and HVE [10] ), range queries [25] , disjunctions or conjunctions of equality tests, and, more generally, arbitrary CNF or DNF formulas. Informally, an attribute of inner product predicates is expressed as vector x and predicate f v is associated with vector v, where f v ( x) = 1 iff v · x = 0. (Here, v · x denotes the standard inner product.)
The attribute-hiding security achieved in [16, 17, 18 ] is more limited or weaker than that achieved in [14, 20] . The former is called weakly-attribute-hiding, and the latter fully-attributehiding. Although the IPE scheme [14] achieved fully-attribute-hiding, it is selectively secure under non-standard assumptions. Subsequently, several attribute-hiding IPE schemes have been proposed [16, 17, 18, 19, 23] , for aiming at an IPE scheme with better security, e.g., adaptive security, fully-attribute-hiding and weaker (standard) assumptions. This research direction culminated in adaptively secure and fully-attribute-hiding IPE scheme under the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption [20] . The basic scheme in [20] has a variant with shorter public and tokens based on the technique in [19] . A hierarchical IPE (HIPE) scheme can be realized with the same security. (For a practical variant of the schemes, refer to [22] .)
However, all previous public key IPE schemes have a problem to be applied in a practical system, that is, predicate token queries may leak some sensitive information, e.g., medical personal history, patent strategy, or corporate sensitive data. This is unavoidable in a plain public key IPE system, since anyone can generate a ciphertext associated with any attribute, and then, by using it, check the predicate associated in (target) token. In order to avoid this problem, Shen-Shi-Waters [24] proposed a symmetric-key IPE (SIPE) scheme, where predicate in a token is hidden from any malicious users [24, 26] . The property is called predicate-hiding. They [24] defined a strong security notion "full security", which implies predicate-and attribute-hiding, however, only constructed a weakly secure (selectively secure, single challenge) SIPE scheme since it is based on a weakly secure public key IPE given in [14] . Therefore, to construct a fully secure SIPE remains an interesting open problem.
Moreover, we require such an IPE functionality in a public key setting. To see the importance of predicate-and attribute-hiding IPE in a public key setting, let us consider an example on electronic medical record (EMR) storing and managing system that allows multiple hospitals to export EMRs to a remote server. By sharing EMRs among the hospitals, patient care and cost savings are greatly improved. Moreover, the database system provides a large source of medical research for physicians, biologists, and pharmacists, etc. For example, pharmaceutical companies use it for developing a new medicine.
Here, it is desirable that such a sensitive data be treated as encrypted data even for data processing and retrievals, which protects privacy of data provider. In addition, in the above example, multiple competitors, e.g., pharmaceutical companies, like to hide their access histories from each other. Hence, to apply PE technology to the remote EMR server setting, we require 1. For providing and sharing EMRs among multiple medical institutes, PE should be realized in a public key setting.
2. Attribute-hiding (for data-provider's privacy) and predicate-hiding (for data-retriever's privacy) must be assured.
In other applications with remote storage servers, a PE-encrypted file system with the above properties also highly improves user availability and removes privacy concerns. Recently, Boneh et al. [7, 8] proposed function-private PE (including IPE) schemes, which assure predicate-hiding only when used predicates are sampled from any sufficiently unpredictable distribution. The schemes does not guarantee predicate-hiding in the above setting, in general. Hence, to give a reasonable and useful definition of predicate-hiding IPE in a public key setting which is applicable in the above, is also an interesting open problem from a practical and theoretical point of view. 1 helper) from ciphertexts on the server. Moreover, since converted ciphertexts are not public, security (c) assures both predicate-hiding in tokens and attribute-hiding in ciphertexts against PKG. Since to mitigate the power of PKG is important in PE systems, this security against PKG is useful and interesting. Thus, to summarize, the proposed scheme provides attribute-hiding for ciphertexts as in [20] and predicate-hiding for tokens from any malicious users but the helper. The technique can be applied to unbounded IPE in [21] .
Our Results
Hospital
3. We propose the first fully secure symmetric-key IPE (SIPE) scheme in the sense of the definition by Shen, Shi and Waters [24] (Section 4). The scheme is (generically) converted from our public key setting IPE-CC by including public key and conversion key into (master) secret key. The security is also proven under the DLIN assumption in the standard model. 4 . We also present a variant of the proposed IPE-CC scheme with the same security that achieves shorter public key and shorter (master) secret key (Section 5). Table 1 in Section 6 compares the proposed IPE-CC scheme (resp. SIPE scheme) with existing attributehiding IPE schemes in the public key setting (resp. the existing SIPE scheme).
Key Techniques
Trapdoor Basis Setup: A full security notion of IPE-CC (in the public key setting) consists of three types of hiding properties against various type adversaries, i.e., malicious users, helper, or PKG. For achieving such a rich security property, we employ a new trapdoor embedded in a public key. See Figure 2 . The setup algorithm produces a pair of random dual bases (B, B * ) on a dual pairing vector space (DPVS), and by using random matrix ck := W , linearly transforms a part of the basis, B (⊂ B), to a new basis D := B · W , which is uniformly and independently distributed from B. It outputs pk := D as a part of a public key and the corresponding sk := B * as a secret key, where the bases are independent from each other if W is not considered. Original ciphrtexts and tokens inherit this independence property from the Figure 2 : Trapdoor basis setup with conversion key ck for public key pk and (master) secret key sk, in which PK := B is not directly used (with Enc, TokenGen, Conv, Query) master key pair. The trapdoor (i.e., conversion key) W transforms the original ciphertexts to searchable ones, which are related to tokens through the dual orthonormal property of (B, B * ). We establish security properties against various level adversaries based on this trapdoor basis setup construction. In a subsequent work [15] , we extend our trapdoor basis approach for achieving fullyanonymous functional encryption schemes, where two trapdoor matrices, W 1 and W 2 , are used in re-encryption key generation and re-encrypted ciphertext generation, respectively.
Multi-System Proof Technique:
As we observed, our IPE-CC scheme implies the first fully secure SIPE scheme. Since no previous SIPE schemes are fully secure, we develop a new technique to obtain the scheme, we call multi-system proof technique, which extends the approach given in [20] .
Based on Waters' dual system encryption methodology, in the previous work [20] , a large hidden subspace was used for achieving fully-attribute-hiding of IPE, where the subspace was 2n-dimensional for n-dimensional attribute vectors and the two n-dimensional blocks played different roles in the proof. Moreover, to hide a challenge bit b from adversary, unbiased ciphertexts with ω 0 x (0) + ω 1 x (1) for challenge x (0) , x (1) ∈ F n q (and ω 0 , ω 1 U ← F q ) played a key role in the security proof.
In this work, for achieving both fully predicate-and attribute-hiding security of our schemes, a simulator must deal with two types of challenges ( x (0) , x (1) ) and ( v (0) , v (1) ) simultaneously. Since the above unbiased ciphertext (or token) construction is not enough for this purpose, we use larger, 3n-dimensional, multi-system hidden subspace, and refined game hopping. 2 See Appendix A for the details.
Notations
When A is a random variable or distribution, y R ← A denotes that y is randomly selected from A according to its distribution. When A is a set, y U ← A denotes that y is uniformly selected from A. We denote the finite field of order q by F q , and F q \ {0} by F × q . A vector symbol denotes a vector representation over F q , e.g., x denotes (
The vector 0 is abused as the zero vector in F n q for any n. X T denotes the transpose of matrix X. I and 0 denote the × identity matrix and the × zero matrix, respectively. A bold face letter denotes an element of vector space V, e.g.,
dimension n, e j denotes the canonical basis vector (
. . , n. GL(n, F q ) denotes the general linear group of degree n over F q .
Definitions
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces (DPVS)
In this paper, for simplicity of description, we will present the proposed schemes on the symmetric version of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [17, 16, 18 ] constructed using symmetric bilinear pairing groups given in Definition 1. Owing to the abstraction of DPVS, the presentation and the security proof of the proposed schemes are essentially the same as those on the asymmetric version of DPVS, (q, V, V * , G T , A, A * , e), for which see Appendix A.2 in the full version of [18] . The symmetric version is a specific (self-dual) case of the asymmetric version, where V = V * and A = A * .
Definition 1 "Symmetric bilinear pairing groups" (q, G, G T , G, e) are a tuple of a prime q, cyclic additive group G and multiplicative group G T of order q, G = 0 ∈ G, and a polynomialtime computable nondegenerate bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T i.e., e(sG, tG) = e(G, G) st and e(G, G) = 1. Let G bpg be an algorithm that takes input 1 λ and outputs a description of bilinear pairing groups (q, G, G T , G, e) with security parameter λ. 
Definition 2 "Dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS)"
This is nondegenerate bilinear i.e., e(sx, ty) = e(x, y) st and if e(x, y) = 1 for all y ∈ V, then x = 0. For all i and j, e(a i , a j ) = e(G, G) δ i,j where δ i,j = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise, and e(G, G) = 1 ∈ G T . DPVS generation algorithm G dpvs takes input 1 λ (λ ∈ N) and N ∈ N, and outputs a description of param V := (q, V, G T , A, e) with security parameter λ and N -dimensional V. It can be constructed by using G bpg .
Decisional Linear (DLIN) Assumption
Definition 3 (DLIN: Decisional Linear Assumption [4]) The DLIN problem is to guess
For a probabilistic machine E, we define the advantage of E for the DLIN problem as: 
Inner Product Encryption with Ciphertext Conversion (IPE-CC)
This section defines inner product encryption with ciphertext conversion (IPE-CC) and its security. An attribute (or plaintext) of inner product predicates is expressed as a vector x ∈ F n q \ { 0} and a predicate f v is associated with a vector v, where f v ( x) = 1 iff v · x = 0. Let Σ := F n q \ { 0}, i.e., the set of the attributes, and F := {f v | v ∈ F n q \ { 0}} i.e., the set of the predicates. • Setup takes as input security parameter 1 λ , and it outputs a public key pk, a conversion key ck, and a (master) secret key sk.
Definition 4 An inner product encryption with ciphertext conversion (IPE-CC
• TokenGen takes as input a public key pk, a (master) secret key sk, and a predicate vector v. It outputs a corresponding token tk v .
• Enc takes as input a public key pk and an attribute (or plaintext) vector x. It returns an original ciphertext ct x .
• Conv takes as input a public key pk, a conversion key ck, and an original ciphertext ct x . It returns a converted ciphertext CT x .
• Query takes as input a public key pk, a token tk v and a converted ciphertext CT x . It outputs either 0 or 1, indicating the value of the predicate f v evaluated on the underlying attribute x.
Remark 1
In the introduction, we give an application example using a delegation from tk v to tk v ∧ w (:= tk ( v, w) ). While we can add this functionality, the explicit description of the delegation is not included here for simple presentation. Refer to Section 3.3 for the 2-level hierarchical IPE-CC scheme.
An IPE-CC scheme should have the following correctness property: for all (pk, ck, sk)
Otherwise, it holds only with negligible probability.
We then define the full security notion of IPE-CC, which consists of three security notions, i.e., security against malicious users, malicious helper, and malicious PKG. (1) ) and all 
• On the h-th token query, A outputs a predicate vector, v h . The challenger responds
A's queries are subject to the restriction that, for all ciphertext queries ( x (0) , x (1) ) and all 1. The challenger runs Setup to generate keys pk, ck and sk, and pk and sk are given to A.
The challenger picks a random bit b.
A may adaptively make a polynomial number of queries, where each query is one of two types:
• On the -th ciphertext query, A outputs two attribute vectors (
• On the h-th token query, A outputs two predicate vectors, ( v Since a converted ciphertext is not publicly available, it is not given to the adversary in the above Dishonest-PKG game.
Symmetric-Key Inner Product Encryption (SIPE)
This section defines symmetric-key inner product encryption (SIPE) and its security.
An attribute (or plaintext) of inner product predicates is expressed as a vector x ∈ F n q \ { 0} and a predicate f v is associated with a vector v, where f v ( x) = 1 iff v · x = 0. Let Σ := F n q \ { 0}, i.e., the set of the attributes, and F := {f v | v ∈ F n q \ { 0}} i.e., the set of the predicates. An SIPE scheme should have the following correctness property: for all sk
Otherwise, it holds with negligible probability.
We then define the full security notion of SIPE, which is the same as that given by Shen, Shi, and Waters [24] .
Definition 7 (Full Security of SIPE)
The model for defining the full security of SIP E against adversary A is given as follows:
1. The challenger runs Setup to generate secret key sk, and picks a random bit b.
A may adaptively make a polynomial number of queries, where each query is one of two types:
• On the h-th token query, A outputs two predicate vectors, ( v
A's queries are subject to the restriction that, for all ciphertext queries ( x (0) , x (1) ) and all 3 Proposed (Basic) IPE-CC Scheme
Construction
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G IPE ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed IPE-CC and SIPE schemes.
We refer to Section 1.4 for notations on DPVS. For matrix
by a natural multiplication of a N -dim. row vector and a N ×N matrix. Thus it holds an associative law like (gW )W −1 = g(W W −1 ) = g. The proposed scheme is given as:
if e(c, k * ) = 1, output 1, otherwise, output 0.
Remark 2
To realize a delegation from tk v to tk v ∧ w (:= tk ( v, w) ) given in the introduction, we can construct a natural delegation algorithm in a similar manner to [17, 18, 19, 20] . We give the 2-level hierarchical IPE-CC (HIPE-CC) scheme in Section 3.3.
[Correctness]
where ω ∈ F q and ϕ ∈ F n q are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore,
Security
The DLIN assumption is standard [18, 19, 20] and given in Definition 3. Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 is reduced to those of Lemmas 1-3.
Theorem 1 The proposed IPE-CC scheme is fully secure under the DLIN assumption, i.e., for any adversary A, all Adv
Lemma 1 For any adversary A, Adv
DisU A (λ) is negligible under the DLIN assumption.
Lemma 2 For any adversary A, Adv
DisH A (λ) is negligible under the DLIN assumption.
Lemma 3 For any adversary A, Adv
DisPKG A (λ) is negligible under the DLIN assumption.
The proofs of Lemmas 1-3 are given in Appendix B.
Proposed (Basic 2-Level) Hierarchical IPE-CC Scheme
for notation gW , refer to Section 3.1. The hierarchical IPE-CC (HIPE-CC) below is based on the (basic) construction idea given in [16] , however, since the scheme has enough hidden subspace and randomness spaces, the security is proven from the DLIN assumption.
where
The full security notion of IPE-CC is extended to that for (2-level) HIPE-CC schemes in a usual way.
Theorem 2 The proposed (2-level) HIPE-CC scheme is fully secure under the DLIN assumption.
Theorem 2 is proven in a similar manner to Theorem 1.
Remark:
1. While we present a 2-level HIPE-CC scheme here, clearly, the construction can be extended to an arbitrary level HIPE-CC scheme.
2. While the above basic HIPE-CC scheme is built based on [16], if we apply several techniques given in [18, 19] , efficiency of the HIPE scheme is greatly improved.
Proposed SIPE Scheme (Conversion from IPE-CC to SIPE)
The definitions of symmetric-key IPE (SIPE) and full security of SIPE are given in Section 2.4. From the above IPE-CC scheme, we obtain the first fully secure SIPE scheme. Namely, using the IPE-CC scheme, Π IPE-CC := (Setup, TokenGen, Enc, Conv, Query), a modified setup algorithm Setup (1 λ , n) outputs a (master) secret key sk := (pk, ck, sk), where (pk, ck, sk)
and a modified encryption algorithm
where ct x R ← Enc(pk, x), and the rest of algorithms, TokenGen and Query are the same as those of the IPE-CC scheme since an input sk of TokenGen includes (pk, sk). Hence, we obtain a (converted) SIPE, Π SIPE := (Setup , TokenGen, Enc , Query).
Theorem 3 The proposed SIPE scheme is fully secure under the DLIN assumption.
Proof. By the construction, the full security for SIPE Π SIPE is reduced from the Dishonest-User Game security for IPE-CC Π IPE-CC , i.e., for any adversary A, we can construct A from A s.t. Adv 
A Variant for Achieving Shorter Public and Secret Keys
A variant of the proposed (basic) IPE-CC scheme with the same security, that achieves a shorter (O(n)-size) public key and secret key, can be constructed by combining with the techniques in [19] , where n is the dimension of vectors of the IPE-CC scheme. Here, we show this variant.
Construction and Security
Let N := 6n and
We note that L(6, n,
Here, a blank element in the above matrix denotes 0
Random dual orthonormal basis generator G ZIPE,SK ob
with sparse matrices below is used as a subroutine in the proposed variants of IPE-CC and SIPE schemes.
non-zero entries of X, and 
Here, we assume that input vectors, x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and v := (v 1 , . . . , v n ), satisfies x 1 = 0 and v n = 0. The proposed scheme is given as:
..,6n is given in Eq. (1), and
is represented as in Eq. (1) using
if e(c, k * ) = 1, return 1, otherwise, return 0.
,...6 in Remark 3. In Query, c and k * can be alternatively described as 
Theorem 4 The proposed IPE-CC scheme (with short public and secret keys) is fully secure under the DLIN assumption.
Theorem 4 is proven in a similar manner to Theorem 3 (and 4) in [19] . For achieving dual system encryption proof for IPE-CC with employing a sparse matrix, X U ← L(6, n, F q ), for base change, the matrix set L(6, n, F q ) should form a (matrix) group. (For the reason, refer to [19] .) Therefore, proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 4 have the same high-level structure using the full matrix group GL(6n, F q ) and a subgroup L(6, n, F q ) based on Lemma 4, respectively.
Lemma 4 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 2 in the full version of [19]. Okamoto-Takashima [20] gave an attribute-hiding IPE scheme on DPVS framework. Ciphertexts (CT) and (secret-key) token (TK) of the scheme have dimension 4n+2 = 1+n+2n+n+1, where the first one dimension is for encryption of plaintext (not attribute), the second is the real-encoding part (real part, for short) for CT and TK vectors, the third is the hidden part for achieving various forms of CT and TK, the fourth is the TK randomness part, and the fifth is the CT randomness part. Here, because we do not treat a plaintext other than attribute, CT and TK of the scheme are considered as composed of four parts, as indicated below, where the dimension structure is given by 4n + 1 = n + 2n + n + 1. CT and TK of our IPE-CC have the same form, but dimension of each part is different, with 6n = n + 3n + n + n inner-structure. Particularly, 3n dimensional hidden part is crucial for our elaborated security proof of Lemma 1, where three blocks of n dimensional subspaces have different roles in the proof. We call it the multi-system proof technique, and the details are explained in Appendix A.2. 
Efficiency Comparisons
A.2 Intuitions for Proofs of Lemmas 1-3
First, we consider the proof of Lemma 2, where malicious helper A, i.e., adversary has the conversion key W . By computing B := D·W −1 , he knows B. Then, the view of the adversary and the security definition (for the malicious helper) are the equivalent to those given in [20] for fullyattribute-hiding of IPE, except that multiple ciphertext challenges are considered in this paper, while single challenge is treated in [20] . Therefore, we can take a standard hybrid argument to achieve multiple challenge security from single challenge security, which is described in Figure  3 . . . .
where Next, we consider the proof of Lemma 1, where malicious user has no secret keys, sk nor W , but he can ask two types of challenges, (
h ) for h = 1, . . . , ν 2 . The condition on the challenges is given by f v
does not preserve the value of the predicate, e.g.,
). Since the unbiased form is not useful for reflecting the condition to the security proof, we must take another strategy. Through several game hoppings, we change the view of the adversary with challenge bit b to that with 1 − b. The structure of the reduction is given in Figure 4 . (In the figure, P1,..., P6 stand for Problem 1,..., 6, respectively.) The reduction starts Game 0, and after repeating Game 1-sequences for = 1, . . . , ν 1 , repeat Game 2-h sequences for h = 1, . . . , ν 2 , where each sequence transform the h-th queried token to another kind of unbiased form for b ∈ {0, 1} in the sense that forms of Eqs. (15) and (16) in Game 3 are equivalent: The h-th sequence consists of three parts, Game 2-h-1, Game 2-h-2 sequence, and Game 2-h-3, where the main 2-h-2 sequence has another loop structure parametrized by = 1, . . . , ν 1 . The Game 2-h-2 sequence repeats four Games, Game 2-h-2--1,. . ., Game 2-h-2--4, for = 1, . . . , ν 1 . In the last 2-h-2--4 in the sequence, coefficients of the 3n-dimensional hidden part, i.e., span b n+1 , . . . , b 4n (resp. span b * n+1 , . . . , b * 4n ) of the ι-th queried c ι for ι = 1, . . . , ν 1 (resp. the j-th queried k * j for Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-h-2-ν 1 -4
In the second block of the hidden part, an opposite vector σ h v . . .
where all the coefficients in the first and second blocks become zero vectors preparing for the next Game 2-(h + 1) sequence. At the end of Game 2 sequence, we have
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-ν 2 -3
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-ν 2 -3 in Game 3
Through the reverse process, Game 4 and Game 5 sequences, we reach the final Game 5-ν 1 -3, where all queried tokens and ciphertext are normal one for opposite bit 1 − b. Thus, Lemma 1 is proven. Therefore, essentially, the reduction in Figure 4 is a combination of that in Figure 3 and a reverse of that in Figure 3 , with a switch of subspace blocks in Game 3 for bit change from b to 1 − b. However, since we cannot make use of unbiased coefficients in this case, we need one more n-dimensional block in the hidden subspace. The total hidden subspace is 3n-dimensional. We call it multi-system proof technique, which is an extension of the technique in [20] as we see in the above.
Finally, we consider the proof of Lemma 3, where malicious PKG has a secret key sk := B * . The adversary cannot derive (useful) information from original ciphertexts ct x on D and tokens tk v on B * , since he has no D * and B for checking them. The independent property of B and D makes the security proof rather simple. 
B Proofs of Lemmas 1-3 B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. For any adversary A, Adv
is the maximum number of A's challenge ciphertext (resp. key) queries and := (23ν 1 ν 2 + (n + 17)ν 1 + 18ν 2 )/q.
We give (intermediate) games for the proof of Lemma 1 below.
B.1.1 Games for the proof of Lemma 1
Let ν 1 be the maximum number of A's challenge ciphertext queries and ν 2 the maximum number of A's challenge token queries. To prove Lemma 1, we consider the following 8ν 1 ν 2 +6ν 1 +4ν 2 +2 games. In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game.
Game 0 : For j = 1, . . . , ν 2 , the reply to the j-th token query for ( v 
where (1) ) is:
where τ , ω U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 1-( − 1)-3.
Game 1--2 ( = 1, . . . , ν 1 ) : Game 1--2 is the same as Game 1--1 except that the reply to the -th ciphertext query for vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where all the variables are generated as in Game 1--1.
Game 1--3 ( = 1, . . . , ν 1 ) : Game 1--3 is the same as Game 1--2 except that the reply to the -th ciphertext query for vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where τ , ω U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 1--2.
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 1--3
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 1--3
. . .
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 1-ν 1 -3 (= Game 2-0-3)
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 1-ν 1 -3 (= Game 2-0-3)
Game 2-h-1 (h = 1, . . . , ν 2 ) : Game 2-0-3 is Game 1-ν 1 -3. Game 2-h-1 is the same as Game 2-(h − 1)-3 except that the reply to the h-th token query for ( v
h ) is:
where σ h , σ h U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(h − 1)-3.
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-(h − 1)-3
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-(h − 1)-3
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-h-1 (= Game 2-h-2-0-4)
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-h-1 (= Game 2-h-2-0-4) 
. , ν 1 ) : Game 2-h-2-0-4 is Game 2-h-1. Game 2-h-2--1 is the same as Game 2-h-2-( − 1)-4 except that the reply to the h-th token query for ( v (0)
h , v
where all the variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2-( − 1)-4. Here, a part framed by a box (resp. dashed box) indicates coefficients which were changed from the previous game when ≥ 2 (resp. = 1).
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-h-2-( − 1)-4 for ≥ 2
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-h-2-( − 1)-4 for ≥ 2
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-h-2--1
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-h-2--1
Game 2-h-2--2 (h = 1, . . . , ν 2 ; = 1, . . . , ν 1 ) : Game 2-h-2--2 is the same as Game 2-h-2--1 except that the reply to the -th ciphertext query for vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where ω U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2--1.
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-h-2--2
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-h-2--2
Game 2-h-2--3 (h = 1, . . . , ν 2 ; = 1, . . . , ν 1 ) : Game 2-h-2--3 is the same as Game 2-h-2--2 except the reply to the h-th token query for ( v
and the reply to the -th ciphertext query for vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where all the variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2--2.
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-h-2--3
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-h-2--3
Game 2-h-2--4 (h = 1, . . . , ν 2 ; = 1, . . . , ν 1 ) : Game 2-h-2--4 is the same as Game 2-h-2--3 except that the reply to the -th ciphertext query for vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where ω U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2--3.
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-h-2--4
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-h-2--4
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-h-2-ν 1 -4
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-h-2-ν 1 -4
Game 2-h-3 (h = 1, . . . , ν 2 ) : Game 2-h-3 is the same as Game 2-h-2-ν 1 -4 except that the reply to the h-th token query for ( v
where σ h U ← F q , and for all ι = 1, . . . , ν 1 , the reply to the ι-th ciphertext query for vectors
ι ) is:
and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2-ν 1 -4.
Coefficients of the hidden part of c ι in Game 2-h-3
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-h-3
Coefficients of the hidden part of k * j in Game 2-ν 2 -3
Game 3 : Game 3 is the same as Game 2-ν 2 -3 except that, for all j = 1, . . . , ν 2 , the reply to the j-th token query for ( v
where σ j , σ j U ← F q and η j U ← F n q , and, for all ι = 1, . . . , ν 1 , the reply to the ι-th ciphertext query for vectors (
where all the variables are generated as in Game 2-ν 2 -3.
From here on, the reverse game transformations proceed, i.e., Game 4-h-1; Game 4-h-2--i for i=1,. . . ,4; Game 4-h-3; and Game 5--i for i=1,2,3. The final game, Game 5-ν 1 -3 is given as below.
Game 5-ν 1 -3 : Game 5-ν 1 -3 is the same as Game 3 except that, for all j = 1, . . . , ν 2 , the reply to the j-th token query for ( v
where all the variables are generated as in Game 3, and, for all ι = 1, . . . , ν 1 , the reply to the ι-th ciphertext query for vectors (
where all the variables are generated as in Game 3. Note that all k * j and (c ι , f ι ) are normal tokens and ciphertexts for the opposite bit 1 − b to the challenge bit b. The game hopping structure is described by Figure 4 .
Let Adv 
. . , 4 and Adv
. . , 4) and 3, respectively. We will show ten lemmas (Lemmas 12-21) that evaluate the gaps between pairs of neighboring games. From these lemmas and Lemmas 5-10, we obtain Adv
This completes the proof of Lemma 1. , n) , where
B.1.2 Lemmas 5-22 Definition 8 (Problem 1) Problem 1 is to guess
. For a probabilistic adversary B, the advantage of B for Problem 1 as:
Lemma 5 For any adversary B, there is a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter
Proof. Problem 1 is essentially the same as Basic Problem 1 in [18] , where the intractability of the problem is reduced to that of DLIN. Therefore, Lemma 5 is proven in a similar manner as the reduction lemmas in [18].
Definition 9 (Problem 2) Problem 2 is to guess
β (1 λ , n) , where [18] , where the intractability of the problem is reduced to that of DLIN. Therefore, Lemma 6 is proven in a similar manner as the reduction lemmas in [18] . , n) , where [18] , where the intractability of the problem is reduced to that of DLIN. Therefore, Lemma 7 is proven in a similar manner as the reduction lemmas in [18].
Proof. Problem 2 is reduced from Problem 1 in
Definition 10 (Problem 3) Problem 3 is to guess
β, given (param V , B, B * , {h * β,i } i=1,...,n ) R ← G P3 β (1 λG P3 β (1 λ , n) : (param V , B, B * ) R ← G IPE ob (1 λ , 6n), B := (b 1 , . . . , b n , b 3n+1 , . . . , b 6n ), σ,σ , σ U ← F q , for i = 1, . . . , n; η U ← F n q , n 3n n n h * 0,i := ( σ e i , 0 3n , η i , 0 n ) B * , h * 1,i := ( σ e i , σ e i , σ e i , 0 n , η i , 0 n ) B * , return (param V , B, B * , {h * β,i } i=1,...,n ), for β U ← {0, 1}.
Lemma 7 For any adversary B, there is a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter
λ, Adv P3 B (λ) ≤ Adv DLIN E (λ)+ 5/q.
Proof. Problem 3 is essentially the same as Basic Problem 1 in
Definition 11 (Problem 4) Problem 4 is to guess
β (1 λ , n) , where 
Definition 12 (Problem 5) Problem 5 is to guess
where (1 λ , n) , where 
Lemma 11 (Lemma 3 in [18])
For p ∈ F q , let C p := {( x, v)| x · v = p} ⊂ V × V * where V is n-dimensional vector space F n q , and V * its dual. For all ( x, v) ∈ C p , for all ( r, w) ∈ C p , Pr [ xU = r ∧ vZ = w] = Pr [ xZ = r ∧ vU = w] = 1 C p , where Z U ← GL(n, F q ), U := (Z −1 ) T .
Lemma 12
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 1-1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 12, we construct a probabilistic machine B 1-1 against Problem 1 using an adversary A in a security game (Game 1-( − 1)-3 or 1--1) as a black box as follows:
1. B 1-1 is given an integer and a Problem 1 instance, (param V , B, B * , {e β,i } i=1,...,n ).
2. B 1-1 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. (d 1 , . . . , d n , d 5n+1 , . . . , d 6n ) . B 1-1 provides A a public key pk := (1 λ , param V , D).
When the ι-th ciphertext query is issued for vectors (
ι,n )), B 1-1 answers as follows:
(a) When ι < , B 1-1 answers ciphertexts of the form Eqs. (6) and (8) (3) and (4), that are computed using B of the Problem 1 instance and D calculated above.
When a token query is issued for vectors ( v (0)
, v (1) ), B 1-1 answers normal token k * with Eq. (2) for v (b) , that is computed using B * of the Problem 1 instance. Since the -th answered ciphertext is of the form (4) (resp. of the form (5)) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the view of A given by B 1-1 is distributed as in Game 1-( − 1)-3 (resp. 1--1) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1). Then, Adv
This completes the proof of Lemma 12.
Lemma 13
For any adversary A, |Adv
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 13, we define an intermediate game, Game 1--1', and will show the equivalence of the distribution of the views of A in Game 1--1 and that in Game 1--1' (Claim 1) and those in Game 1--2 and in Game 1--1' (Claim 2).
Game 1--1' : Game 1--1' is the same as Game 1--1 except that the reply to the -th ciphertext query for vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where r c,
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 1--1.
Claim 1 The distribution of the view of adversary A in Game 1--1 and that in Game 1--1'
are equivalent except with negligible probability (n + 3)/q.
Proof. We will consider the distribution in Game 1--1. We define new (dual orthonormal) bases (U, U * ) and a basis W of DPVS V below. First, we generate F Proof. In order to prove Lemma 14, we construct a probabilistic machine B 1-2 against Problem 2 using an adversary A in a security game (Game 1--2 or 1--3) as a black box as follows: (d 1 , . . . , d n , d 5n+1 , . . . , d 6n ) . B 1-2 provides A a public key pk := (1 λ , param V , D) .
When the ι-th ciphertext query is issued for vectors (
ι,n )), B 1-2 answers as follows:
(a) When ι < , B 1-2 answers ciphertexts of the form Eqs. (6) and (8), that are computed using B of the Problem 2 instance and D generated above.
..,n of the Problem 2 instance.
(c) When ι > , B 1-2 answers ciphertexts of the form Eqs. (3) and (4), that are computed using B of the Problem 2 instance and D generated above.
When a token query is issued for vectors ( v (0)
, v (1) ), B 1-2 answers normal token k * with Eq. (2) for v (b) , that is computed using B * of the Problem 2 instance. Since the -th answered ciphertext is of the form Eqs. (6) and (7) (resp. of the form Eqs. (6) and (8)) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the view of A given by B 1-2 is distributed as in Game 1--2 (resp. 1--3) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1). Then, Adv
. This completes the proof of Lemma 14.
Lemma 15
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2-1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 15, we construct a probabilistic machine B 2-1 against Problem 3 using an adversary A in a security game (Game 2-(h − 1)-3 or 2-h-1) as a black box as follows:
1. B 2-1 is given an integer h and a Problem 3 instance, (
2. B 2-1 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. (d 1 , . . . , d n , d 5n+1 , . . . , d 6n ) . B 2-1 provides A a public key pk := (1 λ , param V , D).
4. When a ciphertext query is issued for vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ), B 2-1 answers ciphertexts f , c with the form Eq. (6) and (8) for x (b) , that are computed using B of the Problem 3 instance and D generated above.
When the j-th token query is issued for vectors ( v
j,n )), B 2-1 answers as follows:
(a) When j < h, B 2-1 answers a token of the form Eq. (15) , that is computed using B * of the Problem 3 instance. Since the h-th answered token is of the form Eq. (2) (resp. of the form Eq. (9)) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the view of A given by B 2-1 is distributed as in Game 2-(h−1)-3 (resp. 2-h-1) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1). Then, Adv
This completes the proof of Lemma 15.
Lemma 16
Proof. We first consider the case = 1. Then, Game 2-h-2-0-4 is Game 2-h-1. In order to prove Lemma 16, we define an intermediate game, Game 2-h-1', and will show the equivalence of the distribution of the views of A in Game 2-h-1 and that in Game 2-h-1' (Claim 3) and those in Game 2-h-2-1-1 and in Game 2-h-1' (Claim 4).
Game 2-h-1' : Game 2-h-1' is the same as Game 2-h-1 except that the reply to the h-th token query for vectors ( v
where r h U ← F n q \ { 0}, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-1.
Claim 3 The distribution of the view of adversary A in Game 2-h-1 and that in Game 2-h-1'
are equivalent except with probability 1/q.
Proof. We will consider the distribution in Game 2-h-1. We define new (dual orthonormal)
, and set orthonormal bases U : = (b 1 , . . . , b 2n , u 2n+1 , . . . , u 3n , b 3n+1 , . . . , b 6n ) and
The h-th queried token k * is expressed as
h = 0 except for probability 1/q, i.e., except that σ h = 0. Then, vector r h := σ h v (b) h ·(F −1 ) T is uniformly distributed in F n q \ { 0} except for probability 1/q and independent from all the other variables.
(c) When ι > , B 2-2 calculates a ciphertext of the form Eq. (8) , that is computed using B of the Problem 4 instance. B 2-2 answers f and c.
When the j-th token query is issued for vectors ( v
j,n )), B 2-2 answers as follows:
(a) When j < h, B 2-2 answers a token of the form Eq. (15) , that is computed using B * of the Problem 4 instance. The h-th answered token is of the form Eq. (10). Since the -th answered ciphertext is of the form Eq. (8) (resp. of the form Eq. (11)) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the view of A given by B 2-2 is distributed as in Game 2-h-2--1 (resp. 2-h-2--2) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1). Then, (d 1 , . . . , d n , d 5n+1 , . . . , d 6n ) . B 2-3 provides A a public key pk := (1 λ , param V , D).
When the ι-th ciphertext query is issued for vectors (
ι,n )), B 2-3 calculates a ciphertext f ι of the form Eq. (6), and answers as follows:
(a) When ι < , B 2-3 calculates a ciphertext c ι of the form Eq. (14) , that is computed using B of the Problem 5 instance. B 2-3 answers f ι and c ι . 
When the j-th token query is issued for vectors (
j,n )), B 2-3 answers as follows:
(a) When j < h, B 2-3 answers a token of the form Eq. (15) , that is computed using B * of the Problem 5 instance. The h-th answered token is of the form Eq. (12) . Since the -th answered ciphertext is of the form Eq. (13) (resp. of the form Eq. (14)) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1), the view of A given by B 2-3 is distributed as in Game 2-h-2--3 (resp. 2-h-2--4) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1). Then, Proof. In order to prove Lemma 20, we construct a probabilistic machine B 2-4 against Problem 6 using an adversary A in a security game (Game 2-h-2-ν 1 -4 or 2-h-3) as a black box as follows:
Adv
1. B 2-4 is given integers h and a Problem 6 instance, (param V , B, B * , {h * β,i , e β,i,κ } i=1,...,n; κ=1,2 ).
2. B 2-4 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. (d 1 , . . . , d n , d 5n+1 , . . . , d 6n ) . B 2-4 provides A a public key pk := (1 λ , param V , D) . j=1 have the same joint distribution as in Game 2-h-2-ν 1 -4 (resp. Game 2-h-3) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1). . . . , u n , b n+1 , . . . , b 3n , u 3n+1 , . . . , u 4n , b 4n+1 , . . . , b 6n ), We then easily verify that U and U * are dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same as the original bases, B and B * . Tokens and ciphertexts in Game 2-ν 2 -3 over bases (B, B * ) are expressed those in Game 3 over bases (U, U * ). This completes the proof of Lemma 21.
From Claim 7, Adv
Lemma 22
For any adversary A, Adv Proof. All k * j and c ι are normal tokens and ciphertexts for the opposite bit 1 − b to the challenge bit b in Game 5-ν 1 -3. Hence, success probability Pr[ Succ A (λ) ] is success probability in Game 0. Therefore, we have Adv (λ) + , where E -1 (·) := E 1 ( , ·), E -2-h-1 (·) := E 2-1 ( , h, ·), E -2-h-2 (·) := E 2-2 ( , h, ·), E -3-h-1 (·) := E 3-1 ( , h, ·), E -3-h-2 (·) := E 3-2 ( , h, ·), ν 1 (resp. ν 2 ) is the maximum number of A's challenge ciphertext (resp. key) queries and := ν 1 (23ν 2 + 22)/q. Note that Lemma 2 is proven in a similar manner to the basic IPE scheme in [20] . For completeness, we give game transformations for the proof of Lemma 2.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let ν 1 be the maximum number of A's challenge ciphertext queries and ν 2 the maximum number of A's challenge token queries. To prove Lemma 2, we consider the following 4ν 1 ν 2 + 3ν 1 + 1 games. In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game.
Game 0 : For j = 1, . . . , ν 2 , the reply to the j-th token query for v j is: Proof. We will consider the distribution in Game 1--1.
First, we note that since public key D and (master) secret key B * are independent from malicious PKG not in possesion of a conversion matrix W , we only consider vector elements over basis D, here.
We define new (dual orthonormal) bases (W, W * ) of DPVS V below. First, we generate U 1 , U 2
